Drawing parallels between financial markets and carbon markets is easy. Both are utilized by large corporations to execute trades of fungible products, both involve the monetization of products in a way that is difficult to understand and both have witnessed fraud and manipulation at the hands of their participants.
Experience shows that if left to their own devices, bad actors will emerge, looking for ways to “game” the system and use whatever means necessary to make money. This behavior is exemplified by the 2008 financial crash, when mortgage brokers sold mortgages to people who couldn’t pay them back. While the economy suffered tremendous losses, the brokers didn’t. They got paid regardless.
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has demonstrated that this bad behavior can also extend to the carbon market, most recently in the form of tax fraud and basic theft.
Just last month, two top Deutsche Bank executives came under investigation for allegedly selling carbon-emission certificates without paying the proper EU value-added tax (VAT) back to the government. In 2010, using a rather standard scam, thieves were able to convince unsuspecting market participants to email out login and password information, resulting in the pure theft of carbon allowances.
But there’s plenty of value in a carbon market that’s fraud-free. We know that when businesses play by the rules, they create a fair market and a level playing field in which everyone can participate with confidence. And that’s worth pursuing despite the fraud that has plagued the European market.
What can we learn from the past problems of fraud and graft in the markets? And how can new carbon markets prevent it?
What have we learned?
The answer is simple: If there is an opportunity for money to be made, whether legally or illegally, someone will try to take it. If there is a hole or feature that can be exploited, someone will try to exploit it.
Although many thought the original version of the EU ETS was built on a foolproof foundation, it quickly became clear -- through cases of illegal market activity -- that consistent security was lacking and different registries were not coordinating. Similarly, because investors could participate in the market without having to fully prove who they were, it became possible to sell and resell stolen credits. Market criminals were acting true to form and taking advantage of regulatory gaps. The EU ETS suffered as a result.
The EU has been working to steadily plug these holes, but California, with the advantage of advanced warning, has taken the EU market’s lessons to heart. It has recognized the crucial need to tightly control -- and extensively oversee -- who can participate in the carbon market and how. With the help of the state Attorney General’s office, California has adopted more stringent rules than the EU ETS.
Next page: How will California be different?